The irony of TicketMaster's breach notification email


What is Ticketmaster doing to protect customers? We have been working with industry-leading cybersecurity experts, the relevant authorities, including law enforcement, as well as credit card companies and banks. No further unauthorised activity has been seen in the cloud database since we began our investigation. We are offering you a free 12-month identity monitoring service with TransUnion. These services will be provided by Cyberscout, a TransUnion company specialising in fraud assistance and remediation services. You can sign up for this service through the following link: https://bit.ly/TU-sign-up What can I do? There is nothing you need to do. However, exposure of personal information can, in some cases, increase the risk of identity theft or fraud, so it’s always a good idea to monitor your bank accounts. If you notice any suspicious activity, contact your bank and/or credit card companies. Be cautious of unsolicited emails from unknown senders, especially those with unusual content, links, attachments, or requests for personal information over the phone. If you have any questions, you can visit https://bit.ly/Ticketmaster-Data-Security-Incident or contact us at ticketmastersupport@ticketmaster.com. Ticketmaster understands the importance of your personal information and we take its protection very seriously. We apologise for having to write to you in these circumstances.

TicketMaster has joined the long list of companies to lose their customers' information. As is common, they sent out an email to warn poor sods like me who might have had our details snaffled. Their email is particularly poor and contains a delightful example of how not to communicate issues like this. See if you can spot it: In the same breath as warning their customers to look out for suspicious links in emails, they include two obfuscated Bit.ly links! Anyone can create a Bit.ly link…

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You can outsource risk, but you can't outsource reputation


Cyber attack hits major London hospitals. ‘Significant impact’ on King’s College Hospital, Guy’s and St Thomas’ and south-east London GP services, say NHS leaders. A cyber attack has crippled three major London hospitals, causing operations, blood tests and transfusions to be delayed for weeks. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is investigating the source of the ransomware attack, which led to chaos in A&E departments on Tuesday. NHS leaders said there had been a “significant impact” on King’s College Hospital, Guy’s and St Thomas’ and GP services in south-east London. The Telegraph understands that security sources believe the hack to bear the hallmarks of a criminal activity. The attackers behind it are believed to be

Over the last few weeks, I've had several people ask me about the recent hack on the NHS. A ransomware attack has meant that several hospitals have cancelled operations and there is now an urgent demand for blood donors. What does it say about the state of NHS IT that this attack has happened? Nothing. Because the NHS was not hacked. Instead, a company they use to perform blood tests was attacked. Synnovis is the company responsible - they're the ones who have fallen prey to an attacker.…

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A security bug caused by… Dark Mode!


Image is of a Green Shield with a white tick.

Everyone loves Dark Mode. It is kinder on the eyes, less energy intensive, and looks hecking cool. *5 seconds later* We regret to inform you that Dark Mode causes security bugs. (With apologies to Ben Ward) OK, OK. This isn't a particularly severe security bug, but I found it interesting. The Matrix messaging app "Element" lets you sign in to your account on multiple devices. In order to prove those devices are controlled by you, the app asks you to verify the other sessions. This is…

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Bank scammers using genuine push notifications to trick their victims


`In app popup. "Are you on the phone with Chase? We need to check it's you on the phone to us. Let us know it's you and enter your passcode on the next screen. @ Not you? Your details are safe. Just tap 'No, it's not me' and we'll end the call."`

You receive a call on your phone. The polite call centre worker on the line asks for you by name, and gives the name of your bank. They say they're calling from your bank's fraud department. "Yeah, right!" You think. Obvious scam, isn't it? You tell the caller to do unmentionable things to a goat. They sigh. "I can assure you I'm calling from Chase bank. I understand you're sceptical. I'll send a push notification through the app so you can see this is a genuine call." Your phone buzzes.…

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There's nothing you can do to prevent a SIM-swap attack


Photo of a nano SIM card and its plastic housing.

It is tempting to think that users are to blame for their own misfortune. If only they'd had a stronger password! If only they didn't re-use credentials! If only they had perfect OpSec! If only...! Yes, users should probably take better care of their digital credentials and bury them in a digital vault. But there are some things which are simply impossible for a user to protect against. Take, for example, a SIM-swap attack. You probably have your phone-number tied to all sorts of important…

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I made a mistake in verifying HTTP Message Signatures


A pet cat typing on a computer keyboard.

It's never great to find out you're wrong, but that's how learning and personal growth happens. HTTP Message Signatures are hard. There are lots of complex parts and getting any aspect wrong means certain death. In a previous post, I wrote A simple(ish) guide to verifying HTTP Message Signatures in PHP. It turns out that it was too simple. And far too trusting. An HTTP Message Signature is a header which is separate to the message it signs. You might receive a JSON message like this: { …

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O2 UK's Weird MSISDN Lookup API


Sorry, we don’t recognise this number. Please try again.

It's always fun keeping your network inspector tab open. While looking around the O2 UK website, I found this page all about eSIMs. For some reason, it wants to know the user's phone number. I put in a random number, and it refused to let me in. Putting in a genuine O2 number let me through. So what is it doing to validate numbers? It is making an API call to this URl: https://www.o2.co.uk/o/customer/mods/lookup/447700900123 After a bit of testing, this is how I think it works. If you …

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HTTP Signature Infinite Loop?


A padlock engraved into a circuit board.

I'm trying to get my head round HTTP Signatures as they're used extensively in the Fediverse. Conceptually, they're relatively straightforward. You send me a normal HTTP request. For example, you want to POST something to https://example.com/data You send me these headers: POST /data Host: example.com Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2024 14:43:48 GMT Accept-Encoding: gzip Digest: SHA-256=aaC57TDzM0Wq+50We2TkCsdMDvdqON92edg7KI+Hk8M= Content-Type: application/activity+json Signature:…

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A quick look inside the HSTS file


Glowing computer text showing dot com dot info etc.

You type in to your browser's address bar example.com and it automatically redirects you to the https:// version. How does your browser know that it needed to request the more secure version of a website? The answer is... A big list. The HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) list is a list of domain names which have told Google that they always want their website served over https. If the user tries to manually request the insecure version, the browser won't let them. This means that a…

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An open(ish) redirect on Mastodon


Cartoon of a tusked mastodon holding a phone.

I've responsibly disclosed a small security issue with Mastodon (GHSA-8982-p7pm-7mqw). It allows a sufficiently determined attacker to use any Mastodon instance to redirect unwary users to a malicious site. What do you think happens if you visit: https://mastodon.social/@PasswordReset/111285045683598517/admin? If you aren't logged in to that instance, it will redirect you to a 3rd party site. Try opening it in a private browser window. Here's another, less convincing, demo: …

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Hiding malicious commands in copy-and-pasted text


The HTML5 Logo.

Quite often websites will encourage you to copy and paste commands into your terminal. There are a variety of reasons why this is bad - not least because someone could hide malicious code. That's usually done with a bit of CSS to make the evil command invisible, or using Javascript to inject something unwanted into your keyboard. Here's method that I hadn't seen before. Copy this code and paste it into your terminal to see your external IP address: Notice anything weird about it? Depending …

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That's not my printer! Accidentally finding unsecured HP printers in the wild


Screenshot of an HP printer's internal setting screen with everything written in Russian.

The other day, my HP M140w printer stopped working. The day before, it printed fine. This time, nothing. I rebooted, reset, updated, and performed all the modern rituals associated with uncooperative hardware. I logged into to the printer's webserver and clicked around the admin panel. On one page, I found an error message. So, like any self-respecting geek, I ignored what it said and Googled the text. The first result on Google looked hopeful. I clicked on it and, somehow, ended up back on…

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